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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS 
JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK, 
INC., TOM STUBBS, FRANK 
HORTON and DIANA HORTON, 
Defendant-Appellants 
CASE NO. 
17039 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, JUDY BAXTER 
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents have mischaracterized the nature of the case 
in their brief. The court granted an injunction in favor of 
respondent, against Judy Baxter, hereinafter referred to as 
appellant, wherein appellant was enjoined from further main-
taining an eating, beer selling, commercial establishment on 
the property in question. (T.R. 71,72) 
RESTATED DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent did not fully state the disposition in the 
lower court, since they omitted the fact that the injunction 
issued by said court, further enjoined appellant from selling 
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beer out of the single-family dwelling, pursuant to her beer 
license and enjoined her from using the single-family dwell-
ing for any commercial purpose. 
CORRECTED RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent has further mischaracterized the relief appel-
lant is seeking from the above-entitled court. Respondent 
would have this court believe that the relief she is seeking 
would allow her to only use the property in question for a 
commercial establishment. That is only half true, since 
appellant is seeking relief for every license and purpose the 
injunction has prohibited her from using, which relief would 
also include the use of a beer license on said property, since 
prior to this particular action, she did enjoy the benefit of 
a beer license in addition to a commercial license on the 
above-referred to property. 
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As was stated in appellant's brief, the property in 
question was never in a commercial zone, yet since 1935 a 
commercial enterprise has been located on the property. Sub-
sequent to the recently enacted zoning laws, the County Commis-
sion allowed appellant's predecessor, as well as appellant, to 
continue the nonconforming use in said zone, which use included 
the commercial business, prior to its destruction by fire, as 
well as the single-family residence, located on said property, 
which was built solely as a caretaker home for the commercial 
establishment. Appellant takes issue with the characterization 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by respondent that that particular watershed areJ, at the 
side of that particular property now is environmentally 
fragile, with its preservation to be of critical importance 
to respondent. The fact that a commercial establishment, 
with its attendant license to sell beer on that property, 
which has existed since 1935, is really an anomily to the 
characterization of an environmentally fragile and critical 
preservation objective of respondent. 
Further, the original commercial establishment was des-
troyed by fire in 1978, not 1977, as is explained in·appel-
lant's brief. 
Respondent's statement of the facts would imply that apel-
lant completely misrepresented the use to which she was apply-
ing, regarding the single-family residence. If, the evidence 
shows that at the time the building permit was filled out by 
appellant, both Mrs. Snell and Mr. Parker, employees and agents 
of respondent, knew that the use would be commercial, which 
would include the use of a beer license, rather than a single-
family residence. (T.R. 45,51,55,57) 
Further, respondent implies that appellant submitted a 
site plan prepared solely on her own initiative. It, Mro 
Parker, an employee of respondent, told defendant to draft a 
site plan. 
Even though defendant identified the rooms within the 
single-family dwelling as those which could be identified to 
a single-family residence, defendant did tell Mr. Parker that 
-3-
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walls were being knocked out with large closet areas which 
would be used as coolers, in order that appellant would be 
able to sell beer out of the property in question. (T.R. 45) 
Respondents make an issue of the fact that after corn-
pletion of improvements to the home appellant made applica-
tion for a business license for said structure. In reality, 
appellant applied for a building permit to remodel the care-
taker home on November 15, 1978 and Mr. Parker filled out the 
building permit while appellant apprised him of the fact that 
she was intending to sell beer from the caretaker home, once 
it was remodeled into a lounge. The fact to bear in mind is 
that Mrs. Snell, told appellant that in order to keep t11e non-
conforming use viable, a structural remodel or replacement 
had to be made within 12 months of the fire, which 12-month 
period would expire on or about January 17, 1979. Therefore, 
appellant still had a corrunercial and beer license on the 
premises in question. 
Respondent states that appellant knew that her commer-
cial use of the home was, at best, temporary. Such is not 
the case, since respondent interrupted her before she was 
able to complete her answer. (T.R. 50) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT DOES HAVE STANDING IN 
EQUITY TO PRAY FOR ESTOPPEL 
Respondent cites several cases to the effect that "He 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands." Further, 
-4-
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"He who has done inequity shall not have equity. The doc-
trine of unclean hands cuts both ways, especially in this 
case against respondents. Respondents came to the trial 
court seeking equity, yet they are the ones who induced 
appellant to rely to her detriment, which caused her to suf-
fer great financial injury; and respondents were also guilty 
of laches; therefore, they are the ones who came with the 
unclean hands; thus allowing respondent to enjoy the fruits 
of their transgressions. 
Respondent argues that appellant would have this court 
estop the county from exercising its police powers. Yet, 
since the state or an entity therein is really a creation of 
the people whom the entity governs, the entity has no right 
to tranunel its citizens rights, in the name of the entity's 
police powers. Such would be a denial of due process, as is 
set forth in the Constitution of the United States, wherein 
the due process clause specifically states 11 that no state 
shall". In fact, the state should be more scrupulous in its 
dealings with its citizens than one citizen should with 
another. 
Respondent would have this Honorable Court believe that 
appellant falsified her application to respondent, in order 
to obtain a building permit. However, the evidence deduced 
at the trial simply showed that that was not the case. Apel-
lant went to Ron Parker, an employee of the county, employed 
in the building inspection and zoning office (T.R. 33,34) on 
-5-
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November 15, 1978 and applied for a building permit to re-
model the caretaker home. Mr. Parker filled out the build-
ing permit and appellant apprised him of the fact that she 
was going to sell beer from the caretaker home, remodeled 
into a lounge. (T.R. 45) By Iva Snell's own admission, 
she and Mr. Parker both knew at the time of the applica-
tion, or shortly thereafter that the purpose for the re-
modeling was a cormnercial establishment in which beer 
would be sold. (T.R. 45,51,55 and 57) Further, Ms. Snell 
said that she may have told appellant that she could have 
a commercial business in that remodeled home. (T.R. 55) 
In addition, Mr. Parker told appellant to submit to him a 
site plan, wherein she expressed to him that the large 
closets would be in reality cooler. In light of the above, 
it is ludicrous to assume that appellant misled the county 
in any way, since Ms. Snell and Mr. Parker were fully cogni-
zant of the purpose for which the remodeling was done, and 
that Ms. Snell may have told appellant that she could have a 
commercial business in that remodeled home. 
On page 8 of respondents' brief, they make the statement 
that "certainly the weight of evidence supported the court's 
finding: 'That the defendant, Judy Baxter, had no agreement 
with plaintiff allowing commercial use of the single-family 
dwelling."' Respondent does not cite any page in the trial 
record as to that finding. In fact, appellant is at a loss 
as to that specific finding, since they have read and re-
-6-
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read the trial record, hoping to find said finding. If there 
is no such finding, could it be that respondent is intention-
ally trying to mislead this court? 
Even though appellant's building permit application 
had all of the markings of a single-family residence, Mr. 
Parker assisted her in filling out the building permit 
application and as was before stated he and Ms. Snell were 
fully cognizant of the commercial purpose for which appellant 
was remodeling the home. In fact, the fact that respondents, 
through Ms. Snell and Mr. Parker knew the actual purpose, and 
that knowing said purpose they allowed her to proceed in the 
manner in which she did, then most certainly the estoppel 
argument can best be applied against respondents, since they 
caused appellant to rely to her detriment, knowing full well 
that because of their representations or failure to act in-
duced her to so detrimentally rely. 
II 
RESPONDENT CAN BE ESTOPPED FROM 
-SEEKING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION, 
EVEN THOUGH SAID INJUNCTION IS 
BASED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS 
POLICE POWER 
Respondents contend that appellant's contention and 
reasoning is faulty where a party seeking an injunction must 
show a clear legal or equitable right and a well-grounded 
fear of immediate invasion of that right. In support of their 
contention that appellant's reasoning is faulty, they state 
that the doctrine of estoppel is not generally applicable 
-7-
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against a government body. Further, they state "only under 
exceptional circumstances have a few jurisdictions allowed 
estoppel to be applied." For this sweeping declaration, 
respondents cite one case, which at best is a Mississippi 
case, bearing the date of 1977. If the doctrine of estoppel 
is not generally applicable against a governmental body ex-
cept only under "exceptional circumstances" and why did not 
respondent quote a Utah case for that same principle, since 
respondents would have this court believe that that is the 
majority ;rule. Then in support of such an erroneous con-
clusion, respondent cites the case of Salt Lake County v. 
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136,138. The quote by respondent from 
the Kartchner, supra, is really dicta, and is not part of 
the ruling. Quoting from another portion of that same case, 
the court stated: 
"When a municipal corporation seeks vindica-
tion of public rights by injunction, in 
a court of equity, it is on the same foot-
ing as any private person or corporation 
... the court will consider the equities 
between the parties and under some circum-
stances deny equitable relief, because a 
grave injury will be suffered by defendant 
because of a mandatory injunction, with 
little or no benefit to complainant." 
At page 140 of 552 P.2d, the court stated further: 
"A mandatory injunction will never be granted where it might 
operate inequitably or oppressively. 
It would appear that the case cited by respondents of 
State v. St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d 
729, is not the law in the State of Utah, since the Kartchner, 
-8-
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supra case does not rule that the doctrine of estoppel is 
to be applied "only in exceptional circumstances and with 
great caution." 
On page 11 of respondents' brief, they state "it is 
unreasonable to think that a municipality must weigh and 
consider the 'conveniences' before exercising legitimate 
police powers in enforcing its zoning laws. That theory is 
not a 'well established and fundamental rule of law' in the 
field of zoning enforcement." However, the court in 
Kartchner, supra, does that vary weighing of the conven-
iences even when it is dealing with a municipality or a 
governmental entity? The above cite states that the court 
will consider the equities between the parties and in 
effect will balance the fact of a great injury to be 
suffered by defendant and the benefit to the complainant. 
Further, when the above court stated that "a mandatory in-
junction will never be granted where it might operate in-
equitably or oppressively" in order for the court to reach 
that conclusion it has to balance and consider the conven-
iences as well as the detriments involved. 
The case of Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689,690,694,695 (Utah 1979), involved 
a governmental entity and the invocation of the doctrine of 
equitable e·stoppel. That particular case is cited in 
appellant's original brief. In the interest of brevity, 
only one portion of that case will be cited herein: 
-9-
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"The conduct of government should always be 
scrupulously just in dealing with its citi-
zens; and where a public official, acting 
within his authority and with knowledge of 
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment 
and the party to whom it was made has acted 
to his detriment in reliance on that commit-
ment, the official should not be permitted 
to revoke that commitment." 
Certainly, that is the law of the State of Utah, 
rather than the Mississippi case, to whom respondent 
has referred. Further, as was before stated, appellant 
can invoke the doctrine of estoppel, especially since by 
the respondent's agents own admissions, appellant did not 
act fraudulently or in bad faith. 
By Ms. Snell's own admissions, she did not act in a 
manner which exceeded her powers, while dealing with 
appellant. In fact, there was never any evidence deduced 
at the trial to show that Ms. Snell was not authorized to 
grant to appellant the right to have a commercial business 
license and a beer license in the remodeled single-family 
dwelling. 
Appellant wishes to call the court's attention to page 
25 of the trial record, wherein Ms. Snell was directly 
examined by the attorney for respondents, Mr. Davis. In 
response to Mr. Davis' question, Ms. Snell said that she 
is the head of the department for building inspection and 
zoning enforcement and building regulation for Utah County. 
When asked what her main duties were in connection with that 
employment, she stated "to oversee the issuance of building 
-10-
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permits, make sure that the buildings are inspected by the 
inspectors during construction, the issuance of business 
licenses, and the doing that we also check them out to make 
sure everything is okay before they are issued; make sure 
that permits that are issued comply with the zoning ordin-
ance." Then, Ms. Snell went on to state that she had personal 
knowledge regarding the building permits issued to the property 
in question, and that a permit was also given to appellant to 
remodel the existing family home on the property. Since these 
facts are undisputed, and by the very nature of Ms. Snell's 
own admissions that she is the head of that department and is 
to oversee the issuance of licenses and building permits, then 
her acts regarding appellant would show that she did not ex-
ceed her powers in the issuance of such a building permit or 
engaging in acts which caused appellant to rely to her detri-
ment thereon. Therefore, the rule in the Celebrity case, 
would be applicable to the facts set forth in this particular 
case. 
Further, nowhere in the Celebrity case, is there any 
statement that estoppel is inapplicable, except under excep-
tional circumstances. Since that case is a 1979 case, it is 
reasonable to assume that Celebrity, supra, is the latest pro-
nouncement by this court regarding the doctrine of estoppel 
when dealing with a governmental entity. It is obvious that 
by making the statement that respondent has on page 11 of his 
brief, that respondent is not at all familiar with Utah law 
-11-
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regarding the doctrine of estoppel. 
The following are cases which hold that when dealing 
with a governmental entity, such as a municipal corpora-
tion, the doctrine of estoppel is applicable and does not 
have to be applied only in exceptional circumstances. 
In City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 
P.2d 423, 448 (1970), the court stated: "The government may 
be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a 
private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel 
against a private party are present and, in the considered 
view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result 
from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimen-
sion to justify any affect upon public interest or policy 
which would result from the raising of an estoppel." 
In State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725,737 (Haw. 1977), the 
court stated "this court has stated that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is fully applicable against the government 
if it is necessary to invoke it to prevent manifest injustice." 
In Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division of the 
Department of Human Resources, 46 Or.App. 829, 613 P.2d 495,499 
(1980), the court stated that "the theory of equitable estoppel 
is applicable against government agencies in this state." In 
accord with the above-cited rules, are the following cases: 
Gray v. Regional Transportation Department, 602 P.2d 879,880 
(Colo. 1979); Jones v. Kristensen, 563 P.2d 959 (Colo.App. 
1977); Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal.Rptr. 661, 
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431 P.2d 245 (1967); Finch v. Matthews, 443 P.2d 833 (Wash. 
1968); and Fitzgerald v. Neves, Inc., 15 Wash.App. 421, 550 
P.2d 52 (1976). 
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, governmental entities should be treated 
minimally in the same way as any individual is treated. In 
support of that proposition is the Utah Constitutional 
provision that all laws are to be uniformly applied. 
III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 
OUGHT TO BE DISTURBED IF THE EVI-
DENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES CON-
TRARY TO HIS DECISION, OR HE HAS 
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, OR HAS 
MISAPPLIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
In respondents' amended complaint, they stated that 
"defendant's continued failure and refusal to cease and de-
sist from such violation will result in irreparable harm to 
Utah County." Yet, because respondent was unable to bring 
that evidence in over appellant's objections, they are taking 
the ludicrous position that appellant should now be denied 
from claiming that respondent failed to establish immediate 
and irreparable harm to themselves. Since respondent has 
pled irreparable harm, they have the burden to prove irrepar-
able harm during the trial and if they fail to do so, they 
have not proven all of the elements necessary to obtain a 
permanent injunction against appellant. Further, there is 
no evidence whatsoever that the health officer would have been 
able to testify to any irreparable harm. 
-13-
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In furtherance of respondents' ludicrous position, they 
are asking this court to reasonably infer that health and 
safety deficiencies will affect Utah County residents. How 
can they do this when there was no evidence deduced which 
would show that any Utah County residents were affected in 
any manner by any health and safety deficiencies, especially 
where appellant was given the opportunity to correct said 
deficiencies if there were any. If appellant is given the 
opportunity to correct said deficiencies how can respondent 
suffer irreparable injury and harm. 
Appellant can object to any testimony for any grounds 
which she feels are necessary and if upheld, respondent cannot 
now claim that appellant is at fault for respondent's failure 
to meet its own burden of proof. 
It is obvious from appellant's initial brief that the 
court has clearly misapplied principles of law when it granted 
an injunction even where respondent failed to show any detri-
ment to the county during their case in chief. Directing the 
court's attention to pages 53 and 54 of the trial record, 
when such fact was brought to the attention of the trial court, 
the judge queried, "Do they have to?", to which counsel for 
appellant replied, "Well they have pled it." The court then 
replied "As a matter of fact I've precluded it." In none of 
the cases cited by appellant, including the Utah cases cited 
in appellant's brief, is there any principle of law to the 
effect that an injunction can be granted in absence of a show-
ing of irreparable injury and harm. Such is not the law and 
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the trial judge has misapplied the principles of law; there-
fore, he has committed reversible error. (Please ref er to the 
cas~s cited in appellant's brief regarding that particular 
issue.) 
IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS NOT BARRED 
Respondent, by making the statement that "Utah County 
was working with Ms. Baxter's counsel from May, 1979, 
attempting to resolve the matter," thus making an excuse for 
their delay in this matter, they are bringing up evidence 
which is not contained within the trial record and was not 
made an issue in the trial. In fact, their argument has no 
merit, since it is not part of the evidence contained within 
the trial record. 
Further, since appellant argued facts which would show 
that the defense of laches was asserted, respondents cannot 
now bring to the court's attention the failure of appellant, 
if any, to assert the defense of laches, when respondents did 
not object to such testimony at the trial level. Furthermore, 
in Rule 8{e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it states 
"each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and 
direct. No technical forms of pleadings or motions are 
required." Further, in Rule 8(f) it states "all pleadings 
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." In 
other words, pleadings are to be liberal and broad and even 
though not specifically stated, the factual allegations may 
give rise to the defense of laches. Certainly, nowhere in the 
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trial record did respondent object to any testimony which re-
lated to the defense of laches and cannot do so now. 
Further, since respondent is now stating that appellant 
was in clear violation of the zoning ordinances at the time 
she made application for the building permit and the other 
licenses involved herein, why did respondent have to wait so 
long to make that determination, if the violation was so clear. 
Further, since respondent has stated that appellant misrepre-
sented certain facts, of which respondent was aware, why 
didn't they immediately act to correct the violations, rather 
than induce appellant either by their action or inaction to 
rely thereon and thus suffer injury to herself. 
Respondent cites the case of Lockard v. Los Angeles, for 
the proposition that appellant has no vested right to violate 
a zoning ordinance through any continuing violation. That case 
can be distinguished on the fact that a nonconforming use was 
not at issue there but an outright violation of a zoning ordi-
nance. In the instant case, there was a nonconforming use 
which does this in the user. 
Respondent also cites the case of Rockford v. Sallee, 
for the proposition that mere nonaction by a municipality does 
not constitute acquiescence. The facts in this instant case 
show that there is more than mere nonaction by respondent 
which does in fact invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
according to the Celebrity case, supra. 
The doctrine of laches would apply just as much as the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in this particular juris-
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diction. 
v 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS 
CERTAIN ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT 
It is curious to note why respondent in their brief did 
not address point two, raised by appellant, to the effect that 
"the trial court erred in finding that the transfer of the 
business to the home enlarged the nonconforming use"; nor did 
respondent address itself to point three raised by appellant 
in its initial brief to the effect that "the court erred in 
not requiring plaintiff to specifically prove irreparable in-
jury and harm and also erred by granting an injunction without 
requiring plaintiff to prove the same." It is now contended 
by appellant that point two and point three, raised by appellant, 
are not controverted and therefore should be admitted by 
respondent. As a result, the decision reached below should be 
reversed and appellant should be granted her commercial license 
as well as her license to sell beer in the remodeled structure, 
located on the property in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has not gone far afield in her arguments. 
In fact, appellant has zeroed in on the issues to be adjudicatedo 
It is respondent who has gone far afield in his arguments and 
has not specifically addressed the issues which have been raised 
as a result of this appeal. Respondent erroneously states "it 
was not meant to be a review of denial of Ms. Baxter's beer 
license. Nothing in the pleadings refers to a beer license." 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
That statement is a total and complete misrepresentation of 
the issues raised by respondent's amended pleadings, which 
seeks to obtain a total injunction against appellant, pro-
hibiting her from operating a commercial establishment, which 
sells beer therein. In fact, the court on page 71 of the 
trial record stated "I don't think that the nonconforming 
commercial use in the eating, beer-selling commercial estab-
lishment, which still exists, can be expanded to the single-
family dwelling. The temporary use of the home for the sell-
ing of beer during a period of reconstruction of the other 
facility, the eating facility and what was prior to the fire 
also engaged in the selling of beer, does not lawfully enlarge 
the use of that single-family dwelling. I further believe, 
Mr. Biljanic, that the evidence does not support an estoppel 
by the county on the part of the county or that any of the 
evidence really constitutes a valid agreement to issue a 
license for the selling of beer in the single-family dwelling, 
or a license for the use of the single-family dwelling for any 
commercial purpose." That statement by the court completely 
shows that the two issues adjudicated in the hearing below were 
the issues of the license for the selling of beer and the 
license for the use of the single-family dwelling for any 
commercial purpose. For respondent to now state that the 
granting or denial of a beer license is within the exclusive 
domain of the Board of County Commissioners and that said 
board has never been joined as a party to this action, is 
totally ludicrous and inane. Since the court's ruling went 
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to the beer license and the conunercial license and respondent's 
plc1dings also address themselves to those two licenses, then 
those two licenses are directly affected by the injunction 
granted in the court below. The relief for which appellant is 
requesting, is that the injunction be declared null and void 
and contrary to law, which would necessarily put her into the 
position of having a beer license as well as a commercial 
license on the property in question. The court below took away 
appellant's beer license and commercial license; therefore, if 
this court reverses that particular decision, then necessarily 
appellant would again regain her beer license and. her commer-
cial license. 
At this point, it is a statement couched in pomposity that 
respondents can state that defendant's counsel has confused the 
facts considerably. Furthermore, respondent brings up issues 
which were not even part of the trial record, nor were entered 
into evidence, in order to cajole this court into ruling in 
their favor. Such arguments have no place at the appellant 
level. Furthermore, it is obvious that respondent's so-called 
advantage of having participated at the trial, has not helped 
them in meeting their own burdens of proof nor in stating the 
facts and evidence accurately to this Honorable Court. The 
next two paragraphs of respondent's conclusion are totally un-
supported by law and the facts in this case and have been 
dealt with in the original brief of appellant. 
Finally, respondent enumerates certain alleged facts 
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which appellant allegedly testifed to or admitted at trial, 
to which appellant will show the court are totally erroneous, 
to wit: There is no testimony to the effect that appellant 
endorsed the building permit claiming the intended use to be 
residential; in fact, respondent's own witnesses stated that 
they were totally cognizant of the fact that appellant desired 
to have a commercial use in the said home as well as a beer 
license; in fact, Ms. Snell stated that she may have told 
appellant that she could have a commercial use in that single-
f amily dwelling. 
Referring to paragraph 2 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant did file a site plan with the rooms identified 
as residential rooms, however said site plan was filed on Mr. 
Parker's request, and contemporaneous to that filing of said 
plan, appellant informed Mr. Parker of her true intentions of 
using the building as a commercial beer-selling establishment. 
Referring to paragraph 3 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: The fact that appellant spent between $12,000 and 
$15,000 goes more in appellant's favor, since her reliance 
damages are much greater with those two figures. 
Referring to paragraph 4 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant did in fact use the home for a commercial, 
business; but such intent was clearly conveyed to respondent. 
Referring to paragraph 5 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant never did testify that she did not have a 
business license to conduct a business in that home; rather, 
she testified that there was no need for her to have a business 
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license in said home, since she already did have ~ business 
license, in the form of a nonconforming use on the property 
in question. 
Referring to paragraph 6 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant never did state that she intended the commer-
cial use of her home to be temporary, since she was interrupted 
by respondent's attorney's questioning. 
Referring to paragraph 7 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant did intend to transfer business to the new 
structure, or in any unforeseen events. 
Referring to paragraph 8 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: Appellant did experience problems with her partners and 
was unable to transfer, but those two issues are in opposite to 
the instant case. 
Referring to paragraph 9 in the conclusion of respondent's 
brief: The statement by respondent that the problems "were 
not caused by any misleading on the part of Utah County or its 
officers is not correct and has been taken out of context. That 
particular statement just refers to the issue of having two 
commercial uses on the property and does not refer to the fact 
that the county, through its officers and agents, did mislead 
and misrepresent certain facts to appellant, upon which appel-
lant relied to her detriment. There is plenty of evidence and 
testimony given by appellant, showing that the county and its 
employees definitely did mislead her. Furthermore, respondent 
on page 10 of the respondent's brief, is attempting to mislead 
the court here by stating that the court, "supported by the 
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evidence at trial, found no misleading by respondent." 
There was never any finding made to that effect by the 
trial court. Respondent should not attempt to mislead this 
court by quoting passages out of context, especially in view 
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, at 
the end of respondent's conclusion, respondent again brings 
up issues which were not litigated, which are totally and 
completely unsupported by the trial record, in fact, are not 
even mentioned in the trial record. 
Therefore, appellant again prays that the decision 
rendered below be reversed by this court, so that the injunc-
tion gran.ted be of no force or effect, thus allowing appellant 
to again sell beer and operate a commercial establishment in 
the single-family dwelling, now remodeled into a lounge. 
Respectfully submitted this 
'{ day of May, 1981. 
HANSEN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Judy Baxter 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
reply brief of appellant upon the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
at the courthouse, Provo, Utah, 84601, this '7 day of May, 
1981. 
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